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Deceptive trade practices victimize honest merchants as well as
consumers, and impair rational allocation of economic resources. In
recent years, state and federal legislators have become increasingly
concerned with suppression of commercial deception, with the recently
enacted federal Fair Packaging and Labeling Act1 perhaps the most
spectacular development so far.
Banning deception is appropriately a task for state as well as federal
law. Federal legislation for the protection of consumers is a notori-
ously slow process; it took Senator Hart five years to win acceptance for
his truth-in-labeling proposals, and his compulsory package-size sug-
gestions have fallen before stiff opposition.2 In some states, at least,
it is easier to enact consumer protection legislation, particularly where
such laws have the support of local businessmen faced with the decep-
tive practices of competing, out-of-state firms. Three years ago, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rec-
ommended the enactment of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act as a supplement to existing state legislation.3 The Act has already
been passed in five states 4 and is likely to become a significant means
of combatting consumer fraud.
- Assistant Professor of Law, University of Iowa; Visiting Associate Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota; Consultant, Special Committee on Unfair Competition, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. LL.B. 1961, LL.M. 1963, Cornell Uni-
versity; SJ.D. 1966, University of Michigan. This artide, which was accepted at the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the SJ).. degree.,
does not necessarily reflect the views of the National conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws.
1. 80 Stat. 1296 (1966).
2. Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers? Economic Interests be Enacted?,
64 Micm L. REv. 1255 (1966). The House Amendments to the bill are described in
BNA, ATR_. 276: A-8 (10/25/66).
3. In 1966, following a resolution by the ABA Section of Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Law, the Commissioners revised § 3(b) which deals with costs and attorneys'
fees. See ABA SECTION OF PATNT, TRADENtAn, AND Corpvcrr" LAw PRocMEINas 54-56,
64-66 (1965). The official and current version of the Act appears in 9 U.L.A. (Supp. 1965).
The original version of the Act can be found in OPPENHEM, UNFAm TP_E PRACrTCs,
Appendix E (2d ed. 1965).
4. 1965 Conn. Legislative Service 418-19; DL. CODE tit. 6 §§ 1401-07 (Supp.);
IDAHO CoDE ANN. §§ 48-601-06 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. cI. 121V, §§ 311-17
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); OKRA. STAT. AN. tit. 78 §§ 51-55 (Supp. 1966). The Oklahoma
enactment contains substantial deviations from the recommend version of the Act.
485
The Yale Law Journal
The Uniform Act complements other state legislation forbidding
deceptive advertising because the method of enforcement is more
effective than that provided by most existing laws. Traditional decep-
tive advertising statutes carry criminal penalties, which are too severe
and time-consuming to be invoked in all but extreme cases. In some
states, public agencies can enjoin misleading advertising but the
budget of the enforcing agencies is seldom large enough to permit
adequate supervision of merchandising. At best, only flagrant abuses
are enjoined. In contrast, the Uniform Act authorizes injured mer-
chants to bring private actions, and affected consumers to bring class
actions to enjoin every deceptive trade practice which adversely affects
them or those whom they represent.
Practices Prohibited
The deceptive trade practices singled out by the Uniform Act can
be roughly subdivided into conduct involving either misleading
trade identification or deceptive advertising. Specifically, the Act for-
bids undisclosed substitution of other goods or services for those
requested by a customer,5 trade symbol infringement,G misrepresenta-
tion of the geographic origin of goods or services,1 false advertising of
goods, services, and businesses," disparagement of goods, services, and
businesses,9 bait advertising,10 price misrepresentation," and "any
other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding."'1 2 The scope and importance of the Act will be
illustrated by discussion of the provisions dealing with trade symbol
infringement, false advertising, and price misrepresentation, as well as
the relationship of those provisions to the general ban on "other con-
duct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunder-
standing."
Section 2(a)(2) forbids trade symbol infringement caused by simu-
lation of distinctive product features as well as by misleading symbols
used to distinguish goods or services-whether trademarks, service
marks, certification marks, or collective marks.13 The Act reaffirms
5. UNIFOR7 DECEpnvE TRADE PRACCES ACT § 2(a)(1) (1964).
6. Id. §§ 2(a)(2) & (3).
7. Id. § 2(a)(4).
8. Id. §§ 2(a)(5), (6), & (7).
9. Id. § 2(a)(8).
10. Id. §§ 2(a)(9) & (10). "Bait advertising is a practice by which a seller seeks to
attract customers through advertising at low prices products which he does not intend
to sell in more than nominal amounts." Official Comment to §§ 2(a)(9) & (10).
11. UNmFOi i DECEnvE TRADE PRAcCaEs ACT § 2(a)(1l).
12. Id. § 2(a)(12).
13. This is federal Lanham Trademark Act terminology for trade symbols used to
distinguish goods; trade symbols used to distinguish services; trade symbols used to
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the common law principle that it is generally improper to use a com-
mercial symbol which is likely to confuse actual or prospective pur-
chasers as to the source of goods or services 4 and extends the principle
to embrace likelihood of confusion as to the "sponsorship, approval
or certification of goods or services."'r5
The evidence required to establish likelihood of confusion varies
according to the subject matter for which protection is sought. Ordi-
narily, a complainant must at least show substantial similarity between
his and the defendant's trade identifiers, his temporal priority in the
market in question, and a substantial investment in his symbol. This
showing may be sufficient if a plaintiff's trade symbol is composed of
distinctive, nondescriptive language or devices. On the other hand,
if a plaintiff's trade symbol is descriptive or a term which is in common
use as trade identifier, he may have to show that purchasers associate
the particular symbol with him in the context in which he claims pro-
tection. Descriptive language and words in common use as marks
that can be shown to have acquired significance as an indication of
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification are said to have acquired
secondary meaning.'0
The secondary meaning prerequisite is used as much to protect
the interests of junior users who may have adopted their trade symbols
in good faith as to insure against the existence of possible confusion. If
there is evidence that the defendant deliberately copied the plaintiff's
trade symbol, likelihood of confusion may be inferred from concurrent
indicate that the goods or services of another meet the standards of the certifier, and trade
symbols used by an organization, for example, a cooperative, to identify the goods or
services of its members or to indicate membership in the organization. § 45, 60 Stat. 443
(1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). Section 2(a)(3) of the Uniform Act similarly
deals with infringement caused by Lanham Act trade names, trade syTnbols used to dis-
tinguish businesses. Ibid. The Lanham Act breakdown of trade symbols is adopted by the
Uniform Act. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act §§ 1(2), (3), (6), (7), (8).
14. E.g., McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878); VANDENBURGH, TRADEMAn LAW &
PRocmuRa 107 (1959); RESrATEmNT (SECOND), ToRs § 729 & comment a (rent. Draft
No. 8, 1963); Tone & Eovaldi, New Illinois Trade Regulation Laws-The Uniform Decep.
tive Trade Practices Act, 56 TRADEMAEK REP. 534, 536 (1966).
15. The following examples illustrate the breadth of potentially actionable confusion
under the Uniform Act: likelihood of confusion as to source exists where consumers may
erroneously believe that the well-known "Yale" lock company manufactures a defendant's
"Yale" flashlights; likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship exists where consumers may
erroneously believe that Seventeen magazine sponsors a defendant's "Seventeen" girdles;
likelihood of confusion as to approval exists where consumers may erroneously believe
that Consumer Reports has approved a defendant's air-conditioner as a "Best Bu)" and
likelihood of confusion as to certification exists where consumers may erroneously believe
that Underwriters' Laboratories has authorized use of its seal of approval on a de-
fendant's toaster.
16. See generally, DorE, TERrroiA. TRADmAR. Rica-es AND Ta ANmrrausr Lxws 6-8
(1965).
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use of the symbols without regard to secondary meaning.17 It must
be borne in mind, however, that even the presence of likelihood of
confusion due to secondary meaning or deliberate use of a trade
symbol similar to another's trade symbol does not insure that the
senior user will obtain relief. The availability of relief for trade symbol
infringement at common law and under the Uniform Act depends
ultimately on judicial appraisal of the respective interests of the
parties in the light of the likelihood of confusion that exists.18
Moreover, trade symbol protection must yield at some point to the
goal of competitive markets. In deference to competition, Judge Hand
maintained that evidence that consumers cared about source, as well
as evidence of secondary meaning, was necessary to sustain a claim
of product simulation.19 However, other judges were not so punctili-
ous, and indiscriminate relief for product simulation eventually led
the Supreme Court to declare in the Sears-Compco cases that courts
applying state law were precluded by the preemptive effect of the
federal patent and copyright laws from granting relief which pro-
hibited or penalized the copying of an unpatented or uncopyrighted
article, regardless of the presence or absence of secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion.2 0 Nevertheless, the Court was careful to ex-
clude from the sweep of its preemption rationale the use of state
deceptive trade practices law to require labeling and "other pre-
cautionary steps" where product simulation might produce confusion,
as well as the use of state deceptive trade practices law to protect
trademarks, labels, and distinctive dress in packaging.2 1
Sections 2(a)(5), (6), and (7), the false advertising sections of the
Act, make it a deceptive trade practice if a merchant:
represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they
do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status,
17. E.g., Perfectform Corp. v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256,F.2d 736 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 919 (1958). Evidence of deliberate copying has been said to raise a presumption
of likelihood of confusion which must be rebutted by the defendant. E.g., National Van
Lines v. Dean, 237 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir. 1956).
18. E.g., Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph International Corp., 308 F.2d 196(2d Cir. 1962) (denying relief despite likelihood of confusion). Section 8(a) provides that theprinciples of equity condition the availability of relief under the Uniform Act.
19. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917). This doc-
trine makes it virtually impossible to prove actionable product simulation. Stern, Buyer
Indifference and Secondary Meaning in Unfair Competition and Trademark Cases, 32
CONN. B.J. 381, 395-98 (1958).
20. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
21. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
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affiliation, or connection that he does not have; represents that
goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, altered, re-
conditioned, reclaimed, used or secondhand; [or] represents that
goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade,
or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of
another.
Despite the unqualified language of the statute, decisions under
analogous § 43(a) of the federal Lanham Trademark Act suggest that
a person who invokes these false advertising provisions will have
to show that the defendant's advertisement is a false representation of
"fact," that it actually deceives or has the tendency to deceive a sub-
stantial segment of its audience, that the deception is likely to make
a difference in the purchasing decision, and that the particular plaintiff
has been, or is likely to be injured by the deception. In the case
of a merchant-plaintiff, injury may be shown by direct diversion of
sales or by lessening of the good will which the plaintiff's product enjoys
with the buying public. In the case of a consumer class action, injury
will usually consist of the purchase by consumers of goods or services
that are not desired.
Professor Handler believes that limiting legal control of false
advertising to misrepresentations of fact is a "serious defect." "The
skillful advertiser can mislead the consumer without misstating a
single fact. The shrewd use of exaggeration, innuendo, ambiguity and
half-truth is more efficacious from the advertiser's standpoint than
factual assertions." 23 Handler's illustrations demonstrate, however, that
it is a literal and wooden ban on misstatements of fact that he con-
demns,24 and there is no reason that the Uniform Act should be so
interpreted. Sections 2(a)(5), (6), and (7) forbid the "representing" of
certain untruths. "To represent" a fact comprehends far more than
overt factual declaration. 5 Whether a representation of fact is or is not
involved depends primarily on the effect of a statement on the listener
or reader, not on the phrasing of the statement alone; and, as Dean
22. Wel, Protectability of Trademark Values against False Compelitive Advertising.
44 CA. L. L. REv. 527, 537 (1956).
23. HANDL.ER, CASES ON TRADE REGuLAT o 982 (3d ed. 1960).
24. Handler was no doubt drawing in part on his familiarity with the exceedingly
technical construction of statutes providing criminal penalties for false advertising. See
Handler, False and Misleading Advertising, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 28-34 (1929). It may be ques-
tioned, however, whether there is as great a danger of devitalizing interpretation of the
Uniform Act. Judicial treatment of statutes declaring false advertising to be a crime is
in no small degree a reaction to the obloquy associated with a criminal remedy. See
Note, Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUu. L. REv. 1018, 1077 (1956).
25. WEBsrEm, NEv INTERNATI oAL UNABR=xDED Dic'oNARY 1926 (3d ed. 1966).
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Prosser has noted in another context, "The courts quite often have been
willing... to find disparaging statements of fact buried in general as.
sertions, and to permit recovery on that basis. ' 20
Of course, it is true that the limitation of actionable false advertising
to misrepresentations that will be understood as involving facts does
exculpate entirely vacuous seller's talk; but how grave an omission
is that? Buyers who can be misled by glittering generalities that are
shorn of even implicit factual misrepresentations need education, not
legal tutelage. Moreover, the Act invites judicial perception in the
isolation of "buried" misrepresentations of fact. A half-truth, for
example, is at least a half-misrepresentation of fact. Thus, if a refrig-
erator is described as "defrosting automatically" where the cold
storage section defrosts by itself but the freezing compartment does
not, the refrigerator as a whole is not self-defrosting; and the courts
should accordingly find that it is a misrepresentation of fact to
suggest that the refrigerator is self-defrosting. A recent case under §
43(a) of the Lanham Act offers another illustration. In Smith-Victor
Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc.2 7 plaintiff sold a "light bar" for
use in making home motion pictures and defendant sold a competitive
"Sun Gun," which was advertised as follows: "far brighter than any
lamp ever before offered for home movies;" "the beam ... floods an
area greater than the coverage of the widest wide-angle lens;" "pro.
duces 35,000 center-beam candlepower;" and "life is rated, officially,
at 10 hours." On motion for summary judgment the court assumed
all four statements were false, yet held that only the latter two were
actionable. The distinction made was between a general statement
that a product is superior and a misstatement of the "absolute quali-
ties" of a product. This is a reasonable distinction, but it was misap-
plied. All four statements related to objective qualities of the defen-
dant's product and were assumed to be false. All four statements
should have been actionable under § 43(a), as they should also be
actionable under § 2(a)(5) of the Uniform Act.
A requirement that a misrepresentation of fact have a "tendency to
deceive" in order to violate §§ 2(a)(5), (6), and (7) could usually be
easily satisfied. The average consumer, for example, had no indepen-
dent way to tell whether the "Sun Gun" advertised in the Smith-Victor
case did or did not have a life of 10 hours.
A requirement that a false representation be likely to affect the
26. PRossER, TormS 949-50 (3d ed. 1964).
27. 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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purchasing decision of consumers is axiomatic. The law has little neec
to suppress irrelevant misrepresentation. Moreover, misrepresenta-
tions that spur consumer decisions foster misallocations of resources
and are obviously most likely to injure other businessmen and con-
sumers themselves. Yet, the importance of a materiality requirement
with respect to false advertising does not mean that proof of materiality
is exceedingly difficult. The expenditure of substantial sums on a
false claim is evidence that the false advertiser believes that the claim
will influence purchasing decisions,2 and sustained, persuasive ad-
vertising may itself cause even a frivolous product attribute to in-
fluence sales.29
A New Jersey court wrestled with an intriguing problem which
should be considered in connection with the false advertising pro-
visions of the Act. In General Elec. Co. v. Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc.,20
General Electric had obtained an interlocutory injunction requiring
a retailer to disclose in advertising that plaintiff's C-1 model vacuum
cleaner had been superseded by the C-2 model. However, the New
Jersey Superior Court reversed, in part because the C-2 model was
"very little different in performance and general appearance from the
C-i model." Although critics of modem marketing practices have
properly fulminated against needless proliferation of models and
styles, the New Jersey court's action in denying an injunction was
justified largely because there was no evidence in the record to con-
tradict defendant's allegation that the C-i and C-2 models were vir-
tually identical insofar as the consumer was concerned. A consumer
who may be inconvenienced by a model change should be informed
of the change even if it was largely pro forma. Failure to inform con-
sumers of such changes may injure them and seriously impair a manu-
facturer's good will. Thus, evidence that vacuum cleaners, like auto-
mobiles, depreciate according to their model year, or evidence that
parts for the superseded model would become more difficult or ex-
pensive to obtain would have justified the injunction in the General
Electric case even though the successive models of the product looked
alike and performed essentially the same way.
Section 2(a)(11), which forbids "false or misleading statements of
fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price re-
28. Well, supra note 22, at 537-38.
29. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest-Legal Protection oJ Trade Sy)mbols,
57 YALE IJ. 1165, 1170-75 (1948).
30. 36 NJ. Super. 234, 115 A.2d 626 (1955).
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ductions," touches what is probably the most prevalent type of de-
ceptive advertising.31 There are two principal points of contact. Price
claims violate the Act where price reductions are falsely asserted or
implied to exist and where the amounts of actual price reductions
are presented in a false or misleading manner.
Either type of forbidden misrepresentation may or may not be
accompanied by a bogus explanation for the asserted reductions, such
as a purported "fire" or "lost-our-lease" sale. These false explanations
constitute independent violations of § 2(a)(12) and may also be action-
able at common law,3 2 or under a state statute specifically regulating
the conduct of such sales. 3
Ascertaining whether an asserted price reduction is wholly or
partially fictitious can be complex. Though there are some clear-cut
cases, as where inner tubes advertised as "50% off regular first-line tube
list price" are actually third-line inner tubes,3 4 or where a vendor stead-
fastly refuses to honor his low, advertised prices,35 the issue is often com-
plicated by the existence of at least three customary price bases from
which reductions can be made: a supplier's list or suggested retail
price, the advertiser's former price, and the prevailing community
price for the particular item.36 The Federal Trade Commission has
formulated detailed standards concerning the permissibility of adver-
tising discounts from each of these price bases, but the FTC standards
are too intricate for judicial absorption under § 2(a)(11).37 People v.
Minjac Corp.,38 a New York decision applying that state's criminal
false advertising statute to fictitious discounts, suggests a more easily
administered test. Minjac held that it was deceptive for a merchant
to advertise goods for sale at "20% to 40% off" where the price
31. Barnes, False Advertising, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 597, 629 (1962).
32. E.g., Lower Main Street Merchants Assoc. v. Paul Geller & Co., 67 N.J. Super,
514, 171 A.2d 21 (1961) (threatening issue of an injunction against a perpetual "goingout.
of-business" sale).
33. A number of states have statutes which set standards for the conduct of sales
and require a local license in order to hold a sale. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93,
§§ 28A-28F (Supp. 1965). A private injunctive remedy is sometimes authorized with
respect to conduct deviating from the statutory norm. Id. § 28E.
34. Cf. People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 100 P.2d 550 (App. Dept., Super. Ct., L.A.
County 1940).
35. Cf. Goss v. Birnbaum Furniture Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 207, 151 A.2d 705 (Super. Ct.
1959).
56. See 2 TR"E RwE. REP. 1 7897 (1965) (FTC Guide Against Deceptive Pricing);
Recent Developments, 58 COLUm. L. Rav. 1303, 1305 (1958). Seller's cost is another, but
seldom used basis for price reductions. Alexander, Some Problems in the Pricing of Goods,
31 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 141, 149-51 (1962).
37. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7897 (1965) (FTC Guide Against Deceptive Pridng);
Alexander, supra note 36.
38. 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180, 175 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1958).
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basis from which the discount was made was not revealed and the
resulting prices were equal to, or higher than the prevailing com-
munity prices. Applying this principle to § 2(a)(l1), the price basis
from which a discount was made should be required to be disclosed
and the representations concerning the amount of the discount should
be required to be accurate in order to avoid a violation of the Uniform
Act. Moreover, if the price basis of an advertised discount is a former
price of the seller at which no sales ever took place, or if the price basis
is an allegedly prevailing community price which was arbitrarily fixed
by the seller, a violation should also exist. A seller should not be
permitted to engage in misleading discount advertising through his
own contrived use of initial, artificially high prices, or a random guess
as to the prevailing community price. Conversely, a seller should be
permitted to advertise discounts from actual suppliers' list prices, even
though these prices are frequently discounted in his community, and
to advertise discounts from an estimate of a prevailing community
price which is bottomed on some objective evidence. Customers will
see through the former practice if it is widely engaged in, and both
types of advertising may provide consumers with useful comparative
information. Substantial truth in an advertised discount price is both
an improvement over the current situation and a judicially admin-
istrable standard.
Section 2(a)(11) does not deal with the vexatious problem as to
whether goods advertised as "free" are indeed free,39 and with good
reason. The Federal Trade Commission has experienced considerable
difficulty in the formulation of workable rules in this field. 0 Neverthe-
less, once the Federal Trade Commission refines its standards, state
courts can apply the crystallized principles by analogy under section
2(a)(12) of the Uniform Act.
Section 2(a)(12) declares that "any other conduct which similarly
creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding" is action-
able under the Uniform Act. This important provision, like the gen-
eral terms of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, constitutes
legislative recognition that the determination of what is actionable
deceptive conduct should ultimately depend upon "the gradual process
of judicial inclusion and exclusion." 41 The specific deceptive trade
practices in § 2(a) offer guideposts as to what deceptive trade practices
39. See Explanatory Notes, ILL. ANN. STAT. d. 121V,', § 312 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
40. See iary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 65T(5th Cir. 1964), rTCd, 3S2 U.S. 46
(1965).
41. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1934); see generally, Oppenheim,
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can be fruitfully regulated by the courts at the present time, and im-
ply that conduct is permissible if it is germane to the specific sections
but not expressly prohibited. The Uniform Act's limited proscription
of fictitious price claims in § 2(a)(11), for example, implies that the
advertisement of actual price-cuts on loss leaders should not be con-
sidered actionable under § 2(a)(12). Nevertheless, section 2(a)(12)
makes clear that the courts are by and large free to apply the reme-
dial provisions of the Uniform Act to new deceptive trade practices
enunciated by the judges themselves.
FTC experience suggests one particular deceptive trade practice
which warrants prompt judicial development under § 2(a)(12). Un-
fortunate publicity can result from the institution of FTC proceedings
against deceptive trade practices, and the effect of this publicity may
not be dissipated by the agency's eventual exoneration of a respondent.
The allegations of a complaint are invariably more newsworthy than
the terms of a terse notice of dismissal. The FTC, thus, considers that
it is a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for a
businessman to complain to the Commission about a competitor and
then to publicize the fact that a complaint has been lodged with the
Commission before the Commission has decided whether to act on the
complaint.42 Two FTC stipulated settlements of § 5 proceedings sim-
ilarly forbid the dissemination of information concerning § 5 pro-
ceedings against competitors, even where violations were established,
as long as the competitors have forsworn the conduct previously found
to violate the Federal Trade Commission Act.43 These FTC orders
suggest that it should be considered a § 2(a)(12) deceptive trade prac-
tice for a party-plaintiff to publicize the initiation of a proceeding
under the Uniform Act before a determination of his claims on the
merits unless there is a legitimate reason for doing soa 4 and that it
should likewise be a § 2(a)(12) deceptive trade practice to herald past
proceedings under the Act against competitors without extenuating
reasons for doing so.
The Judicial Process in Unfair Competition Law, 2 PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT
J. OF RESEARCH AN) EDUCATION 116 (Conference Supp. 1958).
42. United States Prods. Co., 7 FTC 301 (1924).
43. Lacy Prods. Corp., 26 FTC 1310 (1937) (Stip.); Seeley's (Rupture) Establishment,
Ltd., 21 FTC 785 (1935) (Stip.).
44. A plaintiff should, for example, be privileged to warn persons dealing in goods
bearing what he believes in good faith to be infringing trade symbols that an action has
been commenced under the Uniform Act against the user of the trade symbol and that
that person's distributors and dealers are similarly subject to suit. E.g., Lucien Lelong,
Inc. v. Dana Perfumes, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
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Remedies
The primary remedy for violation of the Uniform Act is an injunc-
don. Section 3(b) gives statutory authority for the award of attorneys'
fees to the prevailing party in certain instances, but the express condi-
tions on judicial discretion to award attorneys' fees make evident that
the award is to be confined to exceptional circumstances. The statute
allows award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the defendant if the plain-
tiff has brought an action which he knew to be groundless, or to the
plaintiff if the defendant has engaged in a trade practice which he
knew to be deceptive;4 1 yet even in these situations the award is not to
be automatic. The statute directs the judge to exercise discretion and
weigh the nuances of the record in passing on every application for at-
torneys' fees. However, courts should be particularly willing to award
attorneys' fees where the plaintiffs are consumers who have prevailed
over merchants who have willfully deceived them; consumers can ill af-
ford to assume for themselves the financial burdens of a suit which only
results in an injunction.
Section 3(a) authorizes the injunctive remedy for the commission of a
deceptive trade practice and outlines the test for standing under the
Uniform Act. Sandwiched among these dispositive provisions, more-
over, is the statement that the availability of relief under the Uniform
Act does not necessarily hinge on the plaintiff's establishing an "intent
to deceive" on the part of the defendant. This is a substantive con-
tribution to the definition of an actionable deceptive trade practice
which would have been more logically placed in § 2. The location of
the provision in § 3(a) undoubtedly derives from § 3's limitation of
remedies under the Act principally to a prospective injunction. This
reliance on an injunctive remedy makes it reasonable to have the sub-
stantive provisions of the Act reach unintentional as well as intentional
conduct.46
One consequence of the actionability of unintentional deceptive trade
45. This is the substance of the 1966 amendment to § 3(b) approved by the Commis.
sioners on Uniform State Laws. The original version of the Uniform Act authorized the
court to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party "in exceptional cases" with the
caveat that attorneys' fees could be assessed against a defendant only if the court found
that he had willfully engaged in a deceptive trade practice. E.g., IL. Ax.x. SrAT. ch.
121, § 313 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965). The "uniform interpretation" dause in § 5 of the
Uniform Act should lead judges in those states which enacted the initial version of the
Act to interpret the original § 3(b) in the light of the 1966 amendment until conforming
amendments are made.
46. CI. Goebel Brewing Co. v. Esslingers, Inc., 373 Pa. 334, 95 A-2d 523 (1953) (passing
off); LaTouraine Coffee Co. v. Lorraine Coffee Co., 157 F,d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 771 (1946) (trade symbol infringement); Parkway Baing Co. v. Freihofer Baking
Co., 255 1F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958) (deceptive advertising).
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practices under the Uniform Act is that wholesalers and retailers who
are supplied deceptive advertising or goods with infringing trade sym-
bols will be as subject to suit as the originators of these materials. This
liability is most burdensome with respect to goods bearing infringing
trade symbols. Objectionable advertising can simply be taken down or
removed from publication. On the other hand, a retailer or wholesaler
who has been enjoined from trade symbol infringement could con-
ceivably be left with an inventory of goods with infringing symbols,
which goods cannot be sold or advertised without violating the in-
junction unless the offending symbols are removed. Nevertheless, the
Uniform Act follows existing law in subjecting good faith distributors
and dealers to suit for trade-symbol infringement.47 Strict liability
serves to induce wholesalers and retailers to take precautions against
the purchase of goods with infringing trade symbols and thereby re-
duces the number of infringing products on the market.48
The technical liability of wholesalers and retailers for innocent trade-
symbol infringement is not unduly oppressive in practice. Distributors
and dealers can exercise self-help by refusing to stock question-
able items unless they are given an express warranty against infringe-
ment by their supplier. Many trade-symbol users are reluctant to incur
ill-will by suing distributors and dealers and content themselves with
issuing warnings against infringement to the trade while suing only
the person initiating the infringement. Finally, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, which is in force throughout most of the United States,
provides that a contract for the sale of goods by a merchant regularly
dealing in those goods contains an implied warranty against "infringe-
ment or the like," unless otherwise agreed. 49 Although the Code war-
ranty does not appear applicable where innocent wholesalers or re-
tailers suffer economic loss through use of deceptive or disparaging
advertising furnished them by a supplier, general principles allowing
indemnity to innocent, but technical tortfeasors should afford similar
protection. 0
47. E.g., Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler, 132 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1942); Saratoga Vichy
Spring Co. v. Saratoga Carlsbad Corp., 45 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Lucien Lelong,
Inc. v. Dana Perfumes, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 575, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (dictum); REST'rAEMEN ',
TORTS § 734 & illus. 1 (1938).
48. Comment, Liability of Retail Seller for Good Faith Sales of Goods with Infringing
Trade Mark, 3 Vim- L. REv. 372, 376-79 (1958).
49. UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 2-312(3); see generally, Dudine, Warranties Against
Infringement Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 36 N.Y. ST. B.J. 214 (1964). The
Code requires that the buyer seasonably notify the seller of the assertion of a claim for
infringement against the buyer in order to be able to hold the seller to this warranty.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3)(b).
50. See PROSSER, TORTS § 48 (3d ed. 1964). The supplier might also be subject to suit
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Another consequence of § 3(a)'s dispensing with "intent to de-
ceive" is that the Uniform Act does not require a demand that a po-
tential defendant desist from violation as a prelude to suit. This is in
line with the common law view that the service of a summons and
complaint gives a person engaging in wrongful conduct sufficient notice
to justify a prospective injunction.51 Nonetheless, it will generally make
sense for an aggrieved person to demand cessation of objectionable con-
duct before suing. After all, a threat of suit may be sufficient to bring
the prospective defendant to terms. Moreover, if the defendant is in
good faith and ceases the objectionable conduct as soon as the plaintiff
files suit under the Uniform Act, the court may dismiss the complaint
and award costs to the defendant.52 A plaintiff's failure to demand
voluntary discontinuance of defendant's conduct prior to suit may also
be evidence of laches or unclean hands.53 The latter aspect of failure to
give notice could be important with respect to the § 3(b) provision
dealing with award of attorneys' fees.
There are several reasons why relief under the Uniform Act is lim-
ited to an injunction. In the first place, plaintiffs are likely to care more
about ending the unlawful acts than collecting damages, which may
be difficult to prove in even the best of circumstances." Indeed, the
difficulty in establishing recoverable damages caused by deceptive trade
practices is a major reason why plaintiffs seek to recover defendants'
profits instead.55 These profits are more readily demonstrable and their
recovery is naturally a severe blow to feckless tortfeasors. But, although
recovery of profits has been granted with some frequency in trade sym-
bol infringement actions, few guidelines as to when profits should be
allowed have emerged. 0 A leading practitioner, the late Harry D.
for negligent failure to perceive the deceptive or disparaging character of the advertising
or negligent failure to warn the wholesaler or retailer that potentially actionable material
was being disseminated. See Comment, supra note 48, at 380.
51. E.g., Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1948) (alterna-
tive holding) (trade name infringement); B.V.D. Co. v. Davega-City Radio, Inc., 16 F.
Supp. 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (false claims of price reduction). RfSrATEsZ'r, ToRrs § 717, com-
ment a, at 565 (1938). State statutes analogous to the Uniform Act both do and do not
require a formal notice to desist prior to suit. E.g., HAWAtI REv. LAws § 289-15 (Supp.
1965) (48 hour notice requirement-if defendant ceases violation on receipt of notice, "no
injunction shall issue'); MAIc. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.79(1)-28.79(9) (1962), as amended, (Supp.
1965) (no notice provision).
52. See Wynne v. Aluminum Awning Prods. Co., 202 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1953). UNzronm
DEPTV TADE PRAcricES Acr § 3(b) allows costs to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs.
53. Cf. Bulova Watch Co. v. Allerton Co., 216 F. Supp. 875, 877-78 & 878 n.12 (N.D.
Ill. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 328 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1964).
54. Kunin, Erieantompkinitis: The Malady and its Cure, ABA SEcro. OF Tm PATNTr,
TRADEmkaR, AND CoPmiurmr LAw, PROmCEINGs 276, 281 (1961).
55. VANDENBuRGr, TRAsnAwn LAw & PnocrnRz 385-86 (1959).
56. Id. at 383-84.
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Nims, has suggested that this may be because the profits actually de-
rived from deceptive trade practices are in reality no more certain than
the damages caused by them.51
The deterrent and punitive functions of monetary remedies are also
less expedient with respect to the inadvertent deceptive conduct to
which the Act applies than with respect to the calculated flimflamming
of consumers; and the omission of economic penalties from the Act is
of primary significance to merchants injured by unintentional decep-
tion. Section 3(c) of the Uniform Act preserves concurrent remedies for
conduct which also runs afoul of the Act so that merchants can gen-
erally recover damages and profits attributable to willful deception at
common law 8 and consumers can often recover damages with respect
to calculated misrepresentations in tort5 9 or with respect to both guile-
less and calculated misrepresentations on a breach of warranty theory. 0
The draftsmen of the Uniform Act also thought that judges would
be more likely to give straightforward interpretations to the Uniform
Act if the primary consequence flowing from a finding of violation
would be the issue of a prospective injunction "under the principles
of equity." This rationale will lessen in significance after the Uniform
Act has received critical, initial interpretations, and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will undoubtedly
reconsider the remedial provisions of the Uniform Act in connection
with the Conference's periodic reviews of outstanding uniform legis-
lation.
The third cardinal aspect of § 3(a) is its test for standing to sue: "A
person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade practice of another
may be granted an injunction.... Proof of monetary damage; [or] loss
of profits, . . . is not required." An even more remote standing test
might have been adopted. Some private deceptive trade practices legis-
lation dispenses with the necessity of a substantial individual interest
on the part of a plaintiff. A California statute which is analogous to
the Uniform Act, for example, provides that "actions for injunction
under this section may be prosecuted by ... any person acting for the
interests of itself, its members, or the general public."0' Such statutes,
57. 2 Nihs, UNFAIR COMPETrmON & TRADE-MARXS 1590 (4th ed. 1947).
58. Compare Ojala v. Bohlin, 178 Cal. App. 2d 292, 2 Cal. Reptr. 919 (1960) with
Wood v. Peffer, 55 Cal. App. 2d 116, 130 P.2d 220 (1942).
59. E.g., Willard v. Chrysler Corp., CCH PRODs. LIABILrTY Ra'. 5585 (S.C. Sup. Ct.
1966).
60. E.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
61. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3369(5) (Supp. 1965). A California intermediate appellate court
has interpreted less specific language in another statute as competently dispensing with
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in effect, permit private attorneys generalo2 to suppress conduct deemed
of little or no social utility. There is always a danger, however, that
wholesale legislative abandonment of a substantial and adverse in-
dividual interest as a prerequisite for standing will be self-defeating.
Abrupt legislative jettisoning of a traditional and reasonable control
over vexatious litigation may provoke judicial counteraction which
will permanently cripple the intended statutory reform.03 For this rea-
son, § 3(a) of the Uniform Act essentally retains the traditional concept
of a substantial and adverse individual interest as the test of standing.
The Official Comment explains that § 3(a)'s coupling of a "likelihood
of damage" test with the statement that "proof of monetary damage,
[or] loss of profits . . . is not required" simply permits a plaintiff to
satisfy the standing requirement through circumstantial evidence that
the defendant's course of conduct will cause significant economic harm
to the individual plaintiff or to the plaintiff-class.
The significance of the Uniform Act's injunctive remedy as an addi-
tional safeguard against strike suits cannot be overstressed. A defen-
dant's financial liability is not materially increased by permitting "any
persons," including consumers where a class action is appropriate, to
sue for an injunction in order to forestall probable economic loss.0 4
Moreover, the injunctive remedy materially reduces the danger of mul-
tiple suits with respect to the same deceptive conduct. Once one ag-
grieved party has obtained an injunction under the Act there will be
little incentive for others to sue with respect to the same conduct, but,
if they should choose to do so, the initial injunction should ordinarily
evidence of "special injury" as a prerequisite for an injunction. Mering v. Yolo Grocery
& Meat Market, 127 P.2d 985 (Cal. App. 1942).
62. This is Judge Frank's term for persons with minimal individual interests who
are given statutory standing to seek review of administrative action. Reade v. Ewing,
205 F.2d 630, 632 (2d Cir. 1953).
63. See Frost v. City of Los Angeles, 181 Cal. 22, 183 Pac. 342 (1919) (statute dis-
pensing with necessity of individual injury in order to enjoin a public nuisance creates
a "bare technical right" which does not justify an injunction which would impose
considerable hardship on the defendant).
64. Insofar as merchants are concerned, the following should have standing under
the Uniform Act: a person with exclusive rights in a trade s)mbol which is infringed
or enmeshed in deceptive advertising or disparagement by another, cf. Browning King
Co. of N.Y. v. Browning King & Co., 76 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa. 1948), ajJ'd, 176 F.2d 105(3d .Cir. 1949); persons with exclusive sales agencies for trademarked products or
service-marked services with respect to deceptive advertising or disparagement of thoE
products or services within their sales territories, cf. Goss v. Birnbaum ]Furniture Co.,
21 Conn. Supp. 207, 151 A.2d 705 (Super. CL 1959); substantial competitors of a defendant
who have to compete with the goods or services embellished by the defendant's deceptive
trade practices, cf. PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 114(S.D.N.Y. 1964); and members of an industry, the collective reputation ot which is
imperiled by a defendant's misrepresentations, cf. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou
Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
499
The Yale Law Journal
remove any factual "likelihood of damage" to the belated suitors. These
johnnies-come-lately will thus no longer have standing to sue; and, by
bringing suits which they should know to be groundless, will lay them-
selves open to an award of attorneys' fees under § 3(b) in favor of the
defendant. However, violation of an injunction issued under the Uni-
form Act could entitle additional plaintiffs to commence suit where
the person who obtained the original injunction remains dormant for
an unreasonable period of time.
Needless to say, a deliberate violation of an injunction issued under
the Uniform Act under circumstances which do give another person
standing to enjoin the same conduct would also entitle the second
plaintiff to an award of attorneys' fees under § 3(b). Calculated viola-
tion of an injunction under the Uniform Act is the strongest possible
evidence that the defendant "willfully engaged in the trade practice
knowing it to be deceptive."
It may seem that a consumer who has discovered that a merchant
is engaging in deceptive trade practices is not in danger of being de-
ceived again and therefore needs no injunction to protect himself. This
analysis is supported by two lower court decisions indicating that "a
member of the public, as such" has no standing to sue under § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act.65 On the other hand, other consumers who pa-
tronize the business engaging in deceptive trade practices may in fact
be "likely to be damaged" by the deceptive trade practices precisely
because these consumers are not aware of the deception, yet, for this
very reason of course, these consumers will never bring suit. The
social interest in suppression of commercial deception should, how-
ever, override the brittle logic of this legalistic paradox. Enlightened
consumers should be allowed to satisfy the standing requirement of
section 3(a) through a class suit on behalf of their less fortunate
brethren.66 This consumer remedy is only available under the Act
65. See Marshall v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 828, 835 (D. Md.
1959); Carpenter v. Rohm & Haas Co., 109 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1952), afl'd per curiam,
201 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1953). There is a closer question with respect to an individual
consumer remedy under § 43(a) which arguably authorizes recovery of actual damages,
treble damages, and profits for certain violations in addition to an injunction. Damages
could be useful even to a consumer who has "seen the light." The possible availability
of stiff economic penalties for violation of § 43(a) may, however, have induced restrictive
construction of its standing requirement.
66. Cf. Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d 245
(7th Cir. 1942); see Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection,
33 U. CH. L. Rav. 590 (1966) concerning the need for a consumer remedy. There is ample
precedent for allowing an injunction in a class action to run in favor of members of
the class who have not joined as parties-plaintiff. E.g., Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134
F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 979 (1956); National Hairdressers'
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where a substantial number of consumers patronize a potential de-
fendant, for a class action is only maintainable where the persons
constituting a class are so numerous that it would be impracticable
to bring them all before the court.6 7 However, this is also the situation
where a consumer remedy is most desirable, and, in fact, the typical
situation with respect to the most objectionable trade deception. The
commercial con men who prey upon the poor have to fleece large num-
bers of individuals in order to maximize their profits.08
Preemption
The increasing federalization of American law suggests that virtually
any Uniform Act which significantly affects interstate businesses, as
the Deceptive Trade Practices Act certainly does, must be tested for
possible supersession by federal law. The relevant federal statutes are
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 0 the federal patent,0 copyright,71
and trademark laws,7 2 and the Federal Communications Act.3
As should be evident from earlier references, the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act's ban on "unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, 74 encompasses
virtually all the conduct made actionable by the Uniform Act. How-
ever, there is scant likelihood in the foreseeable future that state regu-
lation of deceptive trade practices affecting interstate commerce will
be considered preempted in toto by § 5. The FTC itself takes the posi-
tion that there is no compelling need for exclusive federal regulation
of interstate deceptive trade practices, 75 and neither the Federal Trade
Commission Act nor its legislative history evince a congressional inten-
tion to oust concurrent state regulation which does not impair federal
superintendence of the field.76 Although there could be cases of ad hoc
& Cosmetologists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 41 F. Supp. 701 (D. Del. 1941), aj'd per curiam,
129 F. 2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1942).
67. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAw & 105(a).
68. See generally, Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (1966).
69. §§ 1-11, 38 Stat. 717-24 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
70. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
71. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964).
72. §§ 1-45, 60 Stat. 427-43 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964).
73. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1964).
74. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
75. BNA, ATRR 224: A-8 (10/26/65) (amicus curiae brief in the Federal District
Court for Northern Texas urging non.preemption). The brief proved persuasive. Double-
Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Te,. 1965), appeal dismissed
per curiam, 86 Sup. Ct. 1601 (1966).
76. Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 441 n.20 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
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preemption where the terms of an FTC cease and desist order immu-
nize conduct compelled by the order from attack under state law, the
Uniform Act anticipates this eventuality by excepting from its scope
"conduct in compliance with the orders or rules of, or a statute ad-
ministered by, a federal ... agency."
The Supreme Court incontrovertibly declared in the Sears.Compco
cases that the federal patent and copyright laws supersede certain state
remedies for deceptive trade practices with respect to the copying of
articles. 77 But while state law can no longer prohibit the copying of
an article or grant damages because of mere copying, the Court made
clear that state law can still require honest labeling and "other pre-
cautionary steps" in order to avoid consumer deception:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other
precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being
misled .... 78
Congress, however, has recently narrowed the ambit in which state
law can impose a labeling decree. The Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act of 1966, effective July 1, 1967, sets labeling standards for packaged
consumer commodities79 and provides:
that it is the express intent of Congress to supersede any and all
laws of the States or political subdivisions thereof insofar as they
may now or hereafter provide for the labeling of the net quantity
of contents of the package of any consumer commodity covered by
this Act which are less stringent than or require information dif-
ferent from the requirements of section 4 of this Act or regula-
tions promulgated pursuant thereto.80
In the Sears-Compco cases the Supreme Court carefully confined the
abridgment of state remedies by the federal patent and copyright laws
to sanctions imposed for the copying of goods. Relief for the copying
of labels, distinctive packaging, and trade symbols was expressly dis-
tinguished."'
The Court's exception of labels and trade symbols from the scope
77. Sears, Roebuck 8- Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day.
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
78. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964)
79. "Consumer commodities" are defined to include most pa *aged goods sold to
individuals at retail with the exception of meat, poultry, and tobacco products; lnsectl-
cides, fungicides, and rodenticides; drugs; alcoholic beverages; and seeds. P.L. No. 89-755,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 10(a) (Nov. 3, 1966).
80. P.L. No. 89-755, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. § 12 (Nov. 3, 1966).
81. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
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of the Sears-Compco cases can be taken more or less at face value, but
the cognate reservation with respect to "distinctive dress in the pack-
aging of goods" should be understood as primarily relating to the
origin-identifying features of a form of packaging. The Supreme
Court's evident distaste for anti-competitive applications of state decep-
tive trade practices law surely extends to attempts to assert exclusive
rights in types of packaging, like the ubiquitous polyethylene bag. -2
Indeed, the preemption rationale of the Sears-Compco cases is expressly
applicable to containers, for containers are a subject of federal patent
and statutory copyright protection.13 On the other hand, the precise
color scheme or other nonfunctional means by which a seller distin-
guishes the packages containing his own products from those of others
should fall within the Sears-Compco exception and remain protectable
by a full panoply of state remedies.84
The Uniform Act comes to terms with the Sears-Compco decisions
through recognition in § 3(a) that state remedies with respect to prod-
uct simulation must be circumscribed. The Act provides that, "relief
granted for the copying of an article shall be limited to the prevention
of confusion or misunderstanding as to source." "Article" is defined
in § 1(1) as "a product as distinguished from its trademark, label, or
distinctive dress in packaging."
This language, which was obviously derived from the Sears-Compco
decisions, should be interpreted in accordance with those decisions,
and with the subsequent federal labeling legislation. Thus, likelihood
of confusion arising from a similarity of products or types of pack-
aging-both of which fall within the definition of "article" in § l(l),85
should only entitle a plaintiff to obtain a decree requiring labeling or
"other precautionary steps" consonant with the federal right to copy
derived by the Supreme Court from the federal patent and copyright
laws, and with the limitations imposed by the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act of 1966.
Among the radiations from the Sears-Compco decisions has been the
suggestion that the federal trademark laws, which require secondary
82. See Don Alvarado Co. v. Porganan, 203 Cal. App. 2d 377, 21 Cal. Reptr. 495 (1962).
83. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1260, 328 F.2d 925 (194)
(design patent); Gray v. Eskimo Pie Corp., 244 F. Supp. 785 (D. Del. 1905)(statutory
copyright).
84. See Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 235 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. IlL.
1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1965); Note, Unfair Competition Protection After
Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 101, 124-31 (1965).
85. § 1(1) of the Uniform Act defines an article as a product as distinguished from
its "distinctive dress in packaging." A generic method of packaging is thus not excluded
from the definition of "article."
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meaning in order to register descriptive trade symbols,8 will now be
considered to preempt state law allowing protection in the absence of
secondary meaning.87 This sally, however, disregards nineteen years
of experience with the present federal trademark laws in which the
principal intimations of preemption have been to the effect that federal
registrants cannot obtain broader protection under state law than that
available under the federal statute, not that nonregistrants as well as
registrants are circumscribed by federal standards. 8 The prevailing
view with respect to even these occasional rumblings is illustrated by
a recent Second Circuit decision. In Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexi-
tized Corp.89 the Second Circuit affirmed a trial judge's conclusion that
a federal trademark registration was invalid for lack of secondary
meaning but that plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to relief on the
basis of state law. The court commented:
We do not read the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.... as establishing any constitutional
bar to the application of state law in the instant case.00
However, if the penumbra of Sears-Compco does eventually extend
to the federal trademark laws in the suggested fashion, the effect on
the Uniform Act should be minimal. Secondary meaning would simply
become indispensable to the establishment of likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding, insofar as infringement of descriptive trade
symbols used in interstate commerce is concerned. Should this occur,
the probable result would be a reinterpretation of the likelihood of con-
fusion test with respect to all descriptive trade symbols, however local
their use.91
A latent possibility of preemption by the Federal Communication
Act,92 not to mention the First Amendment issues raised by attempts
to enjoin communications media, underlie § 4(a)(2) which declares
that the Uniform Act does not apply to
86. § 2(e) & (f), 60 Stat. 429 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) & (f) (1964).
87. Comment, The Supreme Court 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 177, 311-12 (1964).
88. See, e.g., Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochrane, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861, 866.67
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dictum); Sargent & Co. v. Welco Feed Mfg. Co., 195 F.2d 929, 935.36 (8th
Cir. 1952); Comment, Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition,
68 HARV. L. REv. 814, 877-78 & n.478 (1955).
89. 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 US. 913 (1965).
90. Id. at 781 n.4. See also Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will.O'the Wisp?
54 TRADEMARK REP. 184, 189 & n.34 (1964).
91. Cf. Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 235 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. 111. 1964),
aff'd, 353 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1965).
92. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
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publishers, broadcasters, printers, or other persons engaged in the
dissemination of information or reproduction of printed or pic-
torial matter who publish, broadcast, or reproduce material with-
out knowledge of its deceptive character ....
There is an analogous provision in the Lanham Trademark Act
limiting injunctions against media dissemination of advertising con-
tamining infringing matter to issues of a periodical that come out after
the media learn of the infringing character of the material.03 The Lan-
ham Act also contains an express provision that an injunction shall not
be issued which will delay the normal distribution of a periodical re-
gardless of a communication medium's knowledge that the particular
issue contains infringing matter.94 Despite the absence of a counterpart
to this latter provision in the Uniform Act, the same result should
follow through judicial obedience to § 3(a)'s command that injunctions
under the Act must be in accordance with principles of equity and on
terms that are reasonable.95
The delicate problems involved in applying the Uniform Act to
communications media suggest that the § 4(a)(2) exemption should be
adhered to rigorously. A disseminator of information should have to
be presented with virtually conclusive proof before he should be con-
sidered to have knowledge that material which he has agreed to pub-
lish is actionable under the Uniform Act. Mere notice that a deceptive
trade practice is claimed to exist or even that a legal proceeding has
been commenced should not be enough.90 During the congressional
hearings on the Lanham Bill, Professor Handler urged that a news-
paper should not be held liable for trade symbol infringement unless
its officers were aware that an advertiser had been judicially deter-
mined to be an infringer.97 In view of the intensely factual nature of a
determination that a deceptive trade practice exists, Handler's ap-
proach would be a reasonable interpretation of what is necessary under
the Uniform Act to give communications media knowledge that par-
ticular data submitted to them for dissemination is actionably decep-
tive in nature. Moreover, wherever a medium of communication is
93. 1 32(2)(b), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(b) (1964).
94. § 32(2)(c), 60 Stat. 438 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(c) (1964).
95. UNrFoRo DEcEP'II- Tiw. PRAcncEs AcT § 3(a); see Mayfair Farms, Inc. v. Socony
Mobil Oil Co., 68 NJ. Super. 188, 194-95, 172 A.2d 26, 29 (1961). Compare Du-gom v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 29 Misc. 2d 394, 214 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. C.L N.Y.
County 1961).
96. Cf. State v. Beacon Pub. Co., 141 Kan. 734, 743, 42 P.2d 960, 966 (1935).
97. Hearings on H.R. 102, HR. 5461, & S. 895 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 121-22 (1941).
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determined to have sufficient advance knowledge of the deceptive
nature of material to be subject to the Uniform Act, any injunction
forbidding publication of that material by the communications me-
dium must scrupulously avoid impairment of the constitutional guar-
antees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
Conclusion
In view of the material role that deceptive trade practices can play
in the misallocation of economic resources and in the infliction of
economic injury on merchants and consumers, there is ample justifi-
cation for broader recognition of a private right of action than cur-
rently exists in many states. Deceptive advertising, disparagment, and
trade symbol infringement which causes likelihood of confusion as to
sponsorship, approval, or certification should be potentially enjoinable
throughout the nation. The Uniform Act will not only enable interstate
businesses to obtain an equivalent degree of protection in every state; it
will also subject local and interstate businesses to the same degree of
legal control in every state. In the third quarter of the twentieth century,
especially in light of the extensive FTC experience in the regulation
of deceptive advertising, disparagement, and misleading trade identifi-
cation, there is no acceptable reason why merchants and consumers
should not be given a freer hand in the suppression of injurious, decep-
tive conduct. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act is a vehicle through
which this result can be accomplished.
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